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UNFRIENDING THE FIRST AMENDMENT: SOCIAL
MEDIA, COURTS, AND JUVENILE GANG
MEMBERS IN CHICAGO
INTRODUCTION
Between 1999 and 2018, nearly 33,000 juveniles were arrested and
labeled gang members by the Chicago Police Department.1 Illinois ju-
venile courts, specifically in the First District (Cook County), are im-
posing probation orders against adjudicated delinquents that prohibit
them from associating with gang members and posting gang-related
content on their social media accounts. The Illinois Juvenile Court Act
empowers the juvenile courts to issue these orders. The courts act in
accordance with the doctrine of parens patriae—attempting to reha-
bilitate the juveniles and provide them with an opportunity for a safer
life.2 However, the probation orders infringe upon the juveniles’ First
Amendment rights of association and speech—and while the state
may be able to put forth a sufficient compelling interest, the probation
orders cannot be worded specifically enough to make them practically
enforceable. Although the Illinois appellate courts have found these
orders to be constitutional, the courts gave too little consideration to
the practical application of the orders—calling into question whether
or not the orders are narrowly tailored. Moreover, the practical effect
of the probation orders may be working to exacerbate the socioeco-
nomic factors that are attributed to youth gang involvement.
The Illinois appellate courts have done an admirable job in trying to
correct the inadequacies of these juvenile court probation orders.
However, given that better home conditions and social ties to role
models may decrease the lure of gangs for juveniles, why do the courts
believe that limiting contact with known or suspected gang members
1. Annie Sweeney & Paige Frye, Nearly 33,000 juveniles arrested over last two decades labeled
as gang members by Chicago Police, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Aug. 9, 2018), https://
www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-met-chicago-police-gang-database-juveniles-
20180725-story.html.
2. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (8th ed. 2004) [hereinafter Parens patriae] (“The state
regarded as a sovereign; the state in its capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care
for themselves.”); see also Parens patriae, NOLO’S PLAIN-ENGLISH LAW DICTIONARY, https://
www.nolo.com/dictionary/parens-patriae-term.html (“Latin for ‘parent of his or her country.’
The power of the state to act as guardian for those who are unable to care for themselves, such
as children or disabled individuals. For example, under this doctrine a judge may change custody,
child support, or other rulings affecting a child’s well-being, regardless of what the parents may
have agreed to.”) (last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
977
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-4\DPL401.txt unknown Seq: 2 24-JUN-20 9:23
978 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:977
on social media will lead to the juveniles avoiding them? Additionally,
in the ever-growing world of social media technology, how can these
probation orders be drawn sufficiently to avoid catching legitimate—
and even helpful and rehabilitative—interactions in the net of regula-
tion and prohibitions? This Comment will proceed as follows. Part I
will introduce the gang problem in Chicago and discuss some of the
reasons why juveniles join gangs and how previous legislation and or-
dinances have attempted to address the problem. This Part will also
discuss how the juvenile courts in Illinois’s First District attempt to
curb juveniles gang involvement and contact on social media, and par-
ticularly how the First District appellate court has viewed these ac-
tions. Part II will argue that, while the court orders may pass a facial
test of constitutionality under the First Amendment, in practice they
are overbroad. Finally, Part III will introduce paths that courts can
take to address the real socioeconomic causes of youth gang involve-
ment. Ultimately, this Comment will show that while the probation
orders being handed down in Cook County may, in certain circum-
stances, pass a facial challenge as supporting a compelling or substan-
tial governmental interest, they are practically impossible and
therefore are not narrowly tailored to the interest.
I. BACKGROUND
The city of Chicago has been dealing with the increasing problem of
street gang violence and youth involvement in gangs for several
years.3 Gangs are turning to social media to spread their message,
communicate with members, and upload media depicting gang activity
and affiliated acts. Gangs use social media to entice and taunt ene-
mies, conceal drug dealing with emoji-text, and even broker peace
deals with rival gangs.4 Local governments, including Chicago’s, are
attempting to address the problem by issuing special probation orders
to adjudicated delinquents. These orders restrict their social media ac-
tivity relating to gang association and posting gang-related materials.
The courts are attempting to keep adjudicated delinquents away from
gangs in two distinct ways. Under the approach seen in In re Omar F.,
courts attempt to construe probation orders as limiting adjudicated
delinquents’ association and contact with gang members on social me-
dia.5 On the other hand, under the approach in In re R.H., courts in-
3. Sweeney & Frye, supra note 1.
4. Michael Tarm, Gangs Embrace Social Media With Often Deadly Results, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT (July 11, 2018), https://www.usnews.com/news/healthiest-communities/articles/
2018-06-11/social-media-altering-street-gang-culture-fueling-violence.
5. In re Omar F., 89 N.E.3d 1023 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-4\DPL401.txt unknown Seq: 3 24-JUN-20 9:23
2020] UNFRIENDING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 979
terpret similar probation orders as restricting the type of content-
based speech the adjudicated delinquents may exercise by stating that
they cannot post gang-related content on their social media accounts.6
While the courts are using their power under the Illinois Juvenile
Court Act to impose such probation conditions, the orders bring up
questions of First Amendment protections and jurisprudence—specif-
ically the rights of association and free speech.
A. The Gang Problem in Chicago
The gang problem in Chicago has been a reality this city has been
fighting for decades. The number of those involved and affected can
be sobering, as well as the reasons why many youths are driven to
gang life. This Section will attempt to briefly discuss the gang problem
in Chicago and some of the reasons why juveniles may be attracted to
gangs. First, this Section will introduce some of the statistics surround-
ing gangs in Chicago and then discuss their violent reality. The Section
will conclude by mentioning some of the reasons why gangs are able
to recruit many juvenile members.
1. Chicago Gang Statistics
Chicago has long had a problem with street gang activity associated
with drugs and violent crime. Gang violence is predominant in many
neighborhoods on the South and West Sides of the city.7 For example,
over a three-day weekend in the summer of 2018, at least seventy-four
people were shot and injured from gun violence, leaving twelve dead.8
Mass shootings in Chicago are often the result of gang violence, with
rival gang members targeting one another.9 The Chicago Police De-
partment (CPD) compiles a list of individuals it has arrested and iden-
tified as gang members.10 As of the fall of 2018, nearly 33,000 juveniles
6. In re R.H., 99 N.E.3d 29, 32 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017), reh’g denied, 99 N.E.3d 29 (Ill. App. Ct.
2018).
7. GREAT CITIES INST., UNIV. OF ILL. AT CHI., The Fracturing of Gangs and Violence in Chi-
cago: A Research-Based Reorientation of Violence Prevention and Intervention Policy (Jan. 2019),
https://greatcities.uic.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/The_Fracturing_of_Gangs_and_Violence_
in_Chicago.pdf.
8. Editorial Board, Chicago’s great shame, Chicago’s Crisis: Blood on the streets, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE (Aug. 6, 2018), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/editorials/ct-edit-vio-
lence-chicago-gangs-police-20180806-story.html [hereinafter Editorial Board].
9. Id.
10. Sweeney & Frye, supra note 1. The numbers in the Chicago Police gang list were recov-
ered pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request and are a source of controversy due to
the tactics the police employed in maintaining the list, and to its accuracy. Id. However, the
figures and article are used only to give a general understanding of the gang problem affecting
juveniles in Chicago.
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arrested since 1999 were labeled gang members by CPD.11 The major-
ity of the listed gang members were African Americans and Hispanics
aged seventeen and younger.12 Perhaps the most startling statistic is
that 60 of the 33,000 juveniles were eleven years old at the time they
were arrested and labeled as gang members.13 The actual figure of
juvenile gang members is unknown, but likely higher than the re-
ported number, since CPD’s list only includes juvenile gang members
who have been arrested.14 The juveniles are spread across 112 frag-
mented gangs, with membership ranging from 9,000 juveniles ascribed
to the Gangster Disciples, to several gangs with only one juvenile
member listed.15 Many of the juvenile gang members are from histori-
cally poverty-stricken,16 violent neighborhoods and join gangs for
protection.17
2. A Violent Reality
Emergency room physicians and practitioners have described the
hospitals in light of the raging gun violence as “a war zone.”18 The
traffic of victims into the hospitals is so great in some areas that practi-
tioners are often dismayed by the visits of “frequent fliers”: “They’re
shot, you treat them, they shoot someone else, or they get shot again.
You just saw them six months ago, and there they are on the
stretcher . . . .”19
The numbers surrounding the gang and gun violence epidemic in
Chicago are sobering. The Chicago Tribune has been keeping record
of the number of homicides in Chicago since 2013, and the numbers
are updated on a weekly basis.20 There were 519 deaths ruled as homi-





15. Sweeney & Frye, supra note 1.
16. See CHICAGO DATA PORTAL, Below Poverty Level by Community, https://
data.cityofchicago.org/Health-Human-Services/below-poverty-level-by-community/b7zw-zvm2
(showing poverty statistics for Chicago broken down by neighborhood) (last visited Apr. 11,
2020).
17. Id.; James C. Howell, Gang Prevention: An Overview of Research and Programs, JUV.
JUST. BULL., Dec. 2010, at 4, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/231116.pdf.
18. John Kass, ER workers on Chicago gang violence: ‘We’re in a war zone too,’ CHICAGO
TRIBUNE (May 8, 2018), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/columnists/kass/ct-met-chicago-vi-
olence-kass-0509-story.html.
19. Id.
20. Tracking Chicago homicide victims, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Mar. 26, 2020), http://
www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-chicago-homicides-data-tracker-htmlstory.html.
21. Id.
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jority of the victims were African Americans.22 The majority of those
killed were males between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five.23 As of
March 12, 2020, there were eighty-nine homicides during the year in
Chicago, which was twenty-eight more at that point than 2019.24
3. Why Gangs?
Juvenile gang involvement and the resulting cycle of illegality and
violence are often tied to the juveniles’ living and learning environ-
ments.25 Some argue that the perpetuating cycle of violence is the re-
sult of “the culture” of the city.26 CPD’s chief of patrol, Fred Waller,
has offered the theory that “Chicago’s terrible tradition of gun vio-
lence is connected to many aspects of life in struggling pockets of the
South and West sides.”27 Waller stated that a lack of “role models” in
these neighborhoods precipitates the cycle of gang involvement and
thus gang violence—“[t]hat’s the life they know.”28 The most com-
monly recognized factors that tend to lead to gang involvement in
general include poor home and social climates, substance abuse, and
personality characteristics.29 Juveniles often turn to gangs for the pos-
sibility of making money, especially as many who choose gang life
come from poorer homes and communities than the average citizen.30
Often associated with the poverty factor in gang involvement is the
fact that many juveniles drawn to gangs have a relation to substance
abuse.31 Substance abuse has been found to influence adolescents’ de-
cisions to reach out to gangs in their communities and join them.32 It
has been argued that substance abusers are likely to magnify their re-
active criminal thinking due to drug-created neurological effects that




25. Kyung H. Kim & Robert J. Kipper, Creativity and Gangs: Who Joins Gangs and Why? A
Critical Review of the Literature, 2 WORLD J. OF BEHAV. SCI. 12, 12 (2016).
26. Editorial Board, supra note 8.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Kim & Kipper, supra note 25, at 12–14 (“Adolescents who have Type-T personality might
be attracted to gangs. Individuals who have Type-T personality include those who seek thrills
(T), stimulation, excitement, attention, and arousal. They tend to be risk takers, have unruly
behavior, and get into more trouble.”).
30. Howell, supra note 17, at 7.
31. Kim & Kipper, supra note 25, at 13.
32. Id.
33. Id. Reactive criminal thinking simply refers to criminal behavior that is a reaction to, or a
result of, a given situation or environment.
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also been reason to link alcohol use, marijuana use, violent behavior,
and gang membership together.34
Furthermore, juvenile violence is associated with witnessing vio-
lence in the home among parents, as well as being surrounded by a
violent culture at school.35 It seems that growing up in a violent cul-
ture and being surrounded by a group of older, violent individuals
prevents the juvenile from interacting with positive role models. These
factors, among others, have combined to lead to the large number of
individuals involved in gang contact not only in the United States, but
specifically in Chicago.36
B. Social Media and Gang Activity
Social media has become an increasingly prominent tool for gang-
related communications, recruitment, and activity—“Facebook, Twit-
ter, Instagram, and other sites have ‘radically altered’ gang culture in
Chicago.”37 Rodney Philips, a gang-conflict mediator in the Engle-
wood neighborhood, stated: “These days, there’s nearly always a link
between an outbreak of gang violence and something online . . . .”38
Gangs have been known to place “a premium on retaliation for per-
ceived disrespect” and, with the advent of social media, comments
that were once only heard through word of mouth in the neighbor-
hood are now available to the masses.39 Some gangs will provoke ri-
vals by “streaming [a] live video showing them walking through rival
turf. Others face off using a split-screen function on Facebook Live
and hurl abuse at each other.”40 Furthermore, this type of “internet
banging” includes gang-related behaviors such as: “(1) promoting
one’s gang affiliation; (2) reporting one’s part in a violent act; and (3)
networking with gang members across the country.”41 Gangs use so-
cial media to broaden their criminal network, while also using the
platforms to build “tough personas” and map out locations for vio-
lence.42 While gang members use social media to further their illicit
34. Id.
35. Id. at 12–13.
36. See Howell, supra note 17.
37. Michael Tarm, Social media altering Chicago street-gang culture, fueling violence, CHICAGO





41. Desmond U. Patton et al., Gang violence on the digital street: Case study of the South Side
of Chicago gang member’s Twitter communication, NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 1, 2 (Jan. 26, 2016).
42. Id.
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agendas, police are attempting to use this internet activity to track and
monitor gangs.43
C. Previous Efforts to Combat Gang Violence and Culture
Previous governmental actions have attempted to attack gang cul-
ture and reduce the public interactions and displays of gang affilia-
tions, all of which have come into conflict with the First Amendment.
This Section will discuss previous actions that have attempted to com-
bat youth gang involvement—specifically dress codes and anti-loiter-
ing ordinances.
1. Dress Codes
Wearing gang-oriented clothing, including certain religious symbols,
is a primary target of some schools and government agencies in reduc-
ing the allure and activity of gangs among juveniles.44 In an attempt to
curtail gangs’ attraction and control gang activity, cities and towns
have imposed curfews, passed “no loitering” ordinances, and even
targeted “outward manifestations” of gang membership, imposing
dress codes and prohibiting the wearing of colors, insignias, and some
religious symbols.45 The municipal governments argued that the pro-
hibition on wearing gang colors and insignia would reduce the force of
the gangs’ public persona and presence.46 These actions were often
challenged on constitutional grounds.
The United States Supreme Court noted that “speech” includes not
only written or spoken conduct but also expressive conduct, and most
courts in judging these dress codes and restrictions used the “incite-
ment” test in judging speech restrictions—“allowing speech to con-
tinue until it reaches a point just short of incitement to violence or
other illegal action.”47 This test provided the legal foundation many of
these towns used to argue for dress codes.48 Although it has also been
argued that school dress codes are symbolic speech, and therefore
protected under the First Amendment, they are not considered fully
protected today.49 In order to impose restrictions upon a student’s
freedom of expression (what can be considered “gang” dress), the
43. Megan Behrman, When Gangs Go Viral: Using Social Media and Surveillance Cameras to
Enhance Gang Databases, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 315, 320 (2015).
44. Ann Kordas, Losing My Religion: Controlling Gang Violence Through Limitations on
Freedom of Expression, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1451, 1453–55 (2000).
45. Id. at 1454.
46. Id. at 1455.
47. Id. at 1462–63.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1487–88, 1464–65.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-4\DPL401.txt unknown Seq: 8 24-JUN-20 9:23
984 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:977
school or town must show the expression poses a “threat to the order
or the educational mission of the school.”50 Furthermore, schools can
prohibit protected freedoms of expression “only if they actually cause
substantial disruption or pose imminent threat of disruption.”51 While
dress code provisions may still be implemented to some extent today,
there is conflicting data on the effectiveness of such regulations.52
2. Anti-Loitering Ordinance
Chicago has also attempted to combat gang activity with the use of
“anti-loitering” ordinances.53 In 1992, Chicago enacted its first Gang
Congregation Ordinance.54 The ordinance prohibited gang members
from loitering in public places and allowed police officers to order “a
person who he reasonably believed to be a criminal street gang mem-
ber” to disperse from the area.55 The ordinance further stated that
loitering was to be defined as “remain[ing] in any one place with no
apparent purpose.”56 The Supreme Court of the United States, in City
of Chicago v. Morales, held that the ordinance was unconstitutionally
vague, and the language of the statute failed to provide an ordinary
person with an understanding of what constituted criminal conduct.57
Furthermore, the Court was afraid that the “no apparent purpose”
language would give police an impermissible level of decision-making
in issuing a dispersal order.58 In response to the Court’s decision in
Morales, Chicago revised its Gang Congregation Ordinance in 2000,
reflecting the language in Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s concurring
opinion.59 The revised ordinance allows police to disperse anyone en-
gaged in gang loitering in a public place, defines gang loitering, and
specifies how one can properly comply with a dispersal order.60 How-
ever, there are questions surrounding the effectiveness of the revised
ordinance and whether or not it solves the vagueness problem stated
50. Kordas, supra note 44, at 1464.
51. Id. at 1465.
52. See generally id.
53. Jane Penley, Urban Terrorists: Addressing Chicago’s Losing Battle with Gang Violence, 61
DEPAUL L. REV. 1185, 1194 (2012).
54. Id. at 1189–90.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1191.
58. Id.
59. Penley, supra note 53, at 1192.
60. Id.; CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015(d)(1) (2004) (“‘Gang loitering’ means remaining in
any one place under circumstances that would warrant a reasonable person to believe that the
purpose or effect of that behavior is to enable a criminal street gang to establish control over
identifiable areas, to intimidate others from entering those areas, or to conceal illegal
activities.”).
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by the Court in Morales.61 Even though the terms were more narrowly
defined, the statute was still open to varying interpretations.62
D. The Judicial Court Act as a Foundation for Curtailing Gang
Contact
This Section discusses the procedural components of the Illinois Ju-
venile Court Act (JCA) and an adjudicated delinquent’s path to re-
ceiving a probation order or conditional discharge, as well as their
rights to appeal. This Section then looks to Illinois case law to show
how the courts have interpreted the provisions of the JCA and the
interests that the Act acknowledges as significant for implementing
restrictive probation conditions.
1. Procedure and Structure
The JCA provides an outline of options relating to the procedure
for handling adjudicated delinquents post-conviction and potential
treatment options the court may impose.63 After a juvenile has been
found guilty of a crime, she appears before the court for a sentencing
hearing, where both sides present evidence of mitigation and aggrava-
tion.64 The judge then lays out her reasoning for the record if there is
to be a commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice.65 In order
to adequately weigh the factors supporting different lengths and types
of sentences, the court will order a social investigation report that is
provided to the parties at least three days prior to the hearing.66 The
report will detail the minor’s pertinent characteristics for purposes of
sentencing, including:
[P]hysical and mental history and condition, family situation and
background, economic status, education, occupation, personal hab-
its, minor’s history of delinquency or criminality or other matters
which have been brought to the attention of the juvenile court, in-
formation about special resources known to the person preparing
the report which might be available to assist in the minor’s rehabili-
61. Penley, supra note 53, at 1202.
62. Id.
63. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-1–405/5-925 (2019). A “delinquent minor” is defined by
the Juvenile Court Act as “any minor who prior to his or her [eighteenth] birthday has violated
or attempted to violate, regardless of where the act occurred, any federal, State, county or mu-
nicipal law or ordinance.” 405/5-105(3). “Minor” refers to a person under the age of twenty-one
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tation, and any other matters which may be helpful to the court or
which the court directs to be included.67
The judge uses the report at sentencing to determine the best path for
the adjudicated delinquent in an effort to ensure that the goals of re-
habilitation are met, or at least strived for.68
If a juvenile court deems it appropriate, the court may place the
adjudicated delinquent on probation or conditional discharge and re-
lease her to her parent, guardian, or legal custodian.69 The statute
states that “the court may as a condition of probation or of condi-
tional discharge require that the minor [among several other provi-
sions]: refrain from having contact, directly or indirectly with certain
persons or particular types of persons, including but not limited to
members of street gangs and drug users or dealers . . . .”70 The court
may also, at its discretion, order the juvenile to “comply with other
conditions” it may order.71 Illinois juvenile courts have used these two
provisions to enact probation orders, such as the one ordered in In re
Omar F.:
You’re to stay away from gangs, guns, and drugs. You need to clear
those from your social media. If you have gang members as friends,
you need to stop hanging out with them.
I don’t want to see any pictures of you and your friends on
Facebook or any other social media if those people are in gangs.
I’m not sure if you’re a gang member or if you’re just an associate of
gangs. I see and hear that there is some contradictory information. I
don’t care.
One way or the other—I mean it would be nice if you’re not a gang
member—but if you are now, I can’t change that. But you’re going
to need to change who you’re hanging out with, otherwise you can
get in trouble on my probation.72
The Illinois circuit courts have the ability to limit or prohibit the con-




69. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-710(1)(a)(i) (2018).
70. 405/5-715(2)(s).
71. 405/5-715(2)(u). The probation decisions, as well as other sentencing provisions imposed,
are appealable as a matter of right to the appellate court in the district in which the sentencing
court is located. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 25/8.1 (2018).
72. In re Omar F., 89 N.E.3d 1023, 1031–32 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017). This probation order will be
discussed more extensively later in the Comment but has been placed here for illustrative
purposes.
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2. Illinois Courts’ Interpretation
Illinois courts have also stated that the juvenile courts may impose
probation restrictions outside of those enumerated in the statutes.
Probation restrictions outside of those enumerated in the statute must
be both reasonable and bear some connection to either the underlying
crime or the behavior to be corrected.73 The courts have noted that “a
probation condition (whether explicitly statutory or not) is reasonable
if the juvenile court believes the condition would be a good idea and
the record contains no indication that the court’s imposition of the
condition is clearly unreasonable.”74
The Illinois Supreme Court has consistently recognized that proba-
tion involves the curtailment of certain liberties due to its nature fol-
lowing a criminal adjudication, and juvenile defendants, because of
their age, are afforded lesser rights than adults.75 Furthermore, the
Illinois Supreme Court noted in Deerfield v. Greenberg:
The Court has long recognized that the status of minors under the
law is unique in many respects . . . . We have recognized three rea-
sons for justifying the conclusion that the constitutional rights of
children cannot be equated with those of adults: the peculiar vulner-
ability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an in-
formed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in
child rearing.76
Specifically, in the realm of street gangs, Illinois’s Streetgang Terror-
ism Omnibus Prevention Act states:
[S]treetgangs are often controlled by criminally sophisticated adults
who take advantage of our youth by intimidating and coercing them
into membership by employing them as drug couriers and runners,
and by using them to commit brutal crimes against persons and
property to further the financial benefit to and dominance of the
street gang.77
The Illinois Supreme Court has also recognized the detriment to soci-
ety that street gangs pose.78 This line of reasoning provides a basis for
juvenile courts to reasonably believe they have the power to impose
probation conditions that target youth involvement in gangs, in hopes
73. In re R.H, 99 N.E.3d 29, 33 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).
74. People v. Hugo G., 750 N.E.2d 247, 256 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (quoting In re M.P., 697
N.E.2d 1153, 1156 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)).
75. See People v. Chambers, 360 N.E.2d 55, 57 (Ill. 1976) (upholding constitutionality of cur-
few state and recognizing limits on minors’ rights).
76. Deerfield v. Greenberg, 550 N.E.2d 12, 16 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (quoting Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622, 633–34 (1979)).
77. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 147/5(c) (2018).
78. People v. Strain, 742 N.E.2d 315, 320 (Ill. 2000) (“street gangs are regarded with consider-
able disfavor by other segments of our society”).
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of having a positive impact on the juvenile’s future. If a juvenile fails
to adhere to the probation conditions, the court may: (1) order the
juvenile to appear before the court, or (2) “order the minor’s deten-
tion if the court finds that the detention is a matter of immediate and
urgent necessity for the protection of the minor or of the person or
property of another or that the minor is likely to flee the jurisdiction
of the court . . . .”79
E. The First Amendment: Speech and Association
The juvenile probation orders issued in Cook County implicate the
First Amendment principles of the rights of association and free
speech. This Section will explore the development of the constitu-
tional right of association in order to give context to the First District
of Illinois’s case analysis, and then discuss the basic framework in
which the right has been construed and applied. The Section will also
introduce the protections content-based speech is afforded under the
First Amendment.
1. The Right of Association
When looking at the fundamental social interactions that provide
the basis of the right of association, the Court has noted that social
contacts that do not occur in the context of an “organized association”
may be unprotected.80 Two main cases described how associational
rights may be “burdened by nondiscrimination requirements.”81 In
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Court upheld the decision of the
appellate court to use the Minnesota Human Rights Act to prohibit
the Jaycees from limiting full membership in their organization to
men.82 The Court stated “the local chapters of the Jaycees are large
and basically unselective groups,” with age and sex being the only es-
tablished membership criteria.83 The Court concluded that the
Jaycees, therefore, “lack the distinctive characteristics that might af-
ford constitutional protection to their members’ decision to exclude
women.”84 In previous opinions, the Court made clear that “a right to
79. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-720(1)(a)–(b) (2018).
80. Right of Association, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, CORNELL LAW SCHOOL, https://
www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-1/right-of-association (last visited Mar. 22,
2020) [hereinafter Right of Association].
81. Id.
82. 468 U.S. 609, 631 (1984); Right of Association, supra note 80.
83. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 621; Right of Association, supra note 80.
84. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 621; Right of Association, supra note 80 (some of these characteristics
include “small size, identifiable purpose, selectivity in membership, perhaps seclusion from the
public eyes”).
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associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by
the First Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for the redress of
grievances, and the exercise of religion”—“is protected against unrea-
sonable burdening . . . .”85
The test for restrictions on the right of association was articulated in
Jaycees: “Infringements on [the right of association] may be justified
by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated
to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means
significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.”86 The Court
recognized a long-standing right to engage in activities that are pro-
tected by the First Amendment, and implicit to that right is a corre-
sponding right “to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of
political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.”87
In Jaycees, the Court stated that the government’s interest in eliminat-
ing discrimination was unrelated to the suppression of expression and
“serve[d] compelling state interests of the highest order.”88
The Jaycees test was reaffirmed, and elaborated upon, as the right
of association test by Boy Scouts of America v. Dale in 2000.89 In Dale,
the Court also stated the test for whether a group is protected by the
First Amendment’s expressive associational right.90 In order to be
protected by the right, the Court must determine the threshold ques-
tion of whether the group engages in “expressive association.”91 First
Amendment protection “of expressive association is not reserved for
advocacy groups. But to come within its ambit, a group must engage in
some form of expression, whether it be public or private.”92
2. Content-Based Speech and Incidental Effects on Speech
The First Amendment protects speech from regulations and statutes
that are deemed to be “content-based”—a principle that is at the very
foundation of the Amendment’s protections.93 The Supreme Court
has stated that the First Amendment carries the understanding that
“government has no power to restrict expression because of its mes-
85. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 618; Right of Association, supra note 80.
86. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 623.
87. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 622.
88. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984).




93. Erwin Chemerinsky, The First Amendment: When the Government Must Make Content-
Based Choices, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 199, 201 (1994).
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sage, its ideas, its subject matter or its content.”94 The Court, in Simon
and Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims, stated that the
First Amendment prohibits content-based restrictions on speech un-
less the government’s regulation can pass strict scrutiny—the regula-
tion is necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest.95 The
Court applies strict scrutiny to regulations that “suppress, disadvan-
tage, or impose differential burdens on speech because of its content”
while applying an intermediate level of scrutiny to content-neutral
regulations.96
In 2015, the Supreme Court in Reed v. Town of Gilbert laid out the
test for determining whether a given regulation on speech is protected
under the Amendment in a multi-level process.97 First, the Court must
determine whether the regulation is content-based or content-neutral.
Government regulation of speech is “content-based if a law applies to
particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or mes-
sage expressed.”98 The Court went on to state:
Some facial distinctions based on a message are obvious, defining
regulated speech by particular subject matter, and others are more
subtle, defining regulated speech by its function or purpose. Both
are distinctions drawn based on the message a speaker conveys,
and, therefore, are subject to strict scrutiny.
Our precedents have also recognized a separate and additional cate-
gory of laws that, though facially content neutral, will be considered
content-based regulations of speech: laws that cannot be “‘justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech,’” or that
were adopted by the government “because of disagreement with the
message [the speech] conveys . . . .” Those laws, like those that are
content based on their face, must also satisfy strict scrutiny.99
Once a regulation has been determined as content-based, the Court
will apply strict scrutiny to determine whether the restriction is nar-
rowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest, and the regula-
tion cannot be over- or under-inclusive in its application.100 A
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 202 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 642
(1994)).
97. 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
98. Id. at 2227.
99. Id. (internal citations omitted).
100. Id. at 2231–32. The Court in United States v. O’Brien stated:
[A content-neutral] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the con-
stitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial govern-
mental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
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regulation can neither be vague nor overbroad, which would defeat
the narrow-tailoring prong of the test.101 Lastly, there are defined cat-
egories of unprotected speech—fighting words,102 obscenity,103 and
promoting illegal activity104—that the government may regulate with-
out the need to satisfy a high level of scrutiny, if any level of scrutiny
at all.
The Court, in United States v. O’Brien, provided an additional wrin-
kle to the determination of which standard of scrutiny to apply to con-
duct-related expression.105 O’Brien’s most significant contribution to
the analysis of speech-related jurisprudence was determining the test
for regulations that are content-neutral on their face.106 The Court
also addressed the issue of regulations of conduct that have incidental
effects on speech.107 In order to be valid and not abridge the First
Amendment, conduct regulations with incidental effects on speech
must further an important or substantial governmental interest unre-
lated to the suppression of free expression and restrict no more speech
than necessary to further that interest.108
F. Illinois’s Court Orders Against Social Media Gang Contact and
Content
The circuit courts of Illinois have submitted sentencing orders ad-
dressing adjudicated juveniles’ use of social media to contact gang
members and display gang content. The Illinois Appellate Court for
the First District has upheld some orders,109 while reversing others.110
This Section will first look to guiding Illinois Supreme Court prece-
dent to illustrate how the courts have interpreted the JCA and applied
constitutional tests in determining their validity. The section will then
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
101. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972) (quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati,
402 U.S. 611, 619–20 (1971) (White, J., dissenting)).
102. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
103. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36–37 (1973).
104. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
771–72 (1976).
105. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376–77.
106. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
107. Id. at 367–77.
108. Id.
109. See generally In re Jawan S., 121 N.E.3d 1002 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018); In re Elijah H., No. 1-
17-2059, 2018 WL 3244654 (Ill. App. Ct. June 29, 2018).
110. See generally In re Tyreese J., No. 1-17-1072, 2017 WL 6210750 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 6,
2017); In re Carlos G., No. 1-17-1953, 2018 WL 1785553 (Ill. App. Ct. Apr. 11, 2018); In re
J’Lavon T., 117 N.E.3d 230 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018); In re K.M., 117 N.E.3d 347 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018);
In re V.H., No. 1-17-1952, 2018 WL 3244836 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018); In re Phazahn D., No. 1-18-
0331, 2018 WL 3375064 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018).
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discuss In re Omar F.’s right of association analysis and In re R.H.’s
content-based speech analysis.
1. Illinois Supreme Court
There is currently no guiding Illinois Supreme Court case that gov-
erns social media no-contact or content probation orders for adjudi-
cated juveniles. It is therefore necessary to look to analogous orders
and how the courts respond to constitutional challenges against them.
The Illinois Supreme Court has ruled on cases in which the juvenile
courts have imposed geographic conditions on the juvenile.111 The
court in In re J.W. addressed a circuit court’s juvenile probation order
restricting the geographic area the juvenile was legally allowed to
enter.112 The court in J.W. ruled on an appeal from a case in which the
twelve-year-old juvenile delinquent admitted to aggravated criminal
sexual assault.113 J.W. was sentenced to five years of probation and
the court imposed, as one of two conditions of his probation order,
that he could not visit or reside in South Elgin, Illinois—the location
of his crimes.114 In imposing the geographical restriction, the circuit
court relied on JCA’s probation section, which allows the court to or-
der the juvenile to “refrain from entering into a designated geographic
area except upon terms as the court finds appropriate.”115 J.W. ap-
pealed the ruling, arguing that “prohibiting J.W. from residing in or
visiting South Elgin as a condition of probation [was] overly broad
and void.”116 The basic premise of the appeal was that the restrictions
were constitutionally overbroad and therefore invalid.117
The decision in J.W. acknowledged that juvenile courts have “broad
discretion to impose probation conditions, whether expressly allowed
by statute or not, to achieve the goals of fostering rehabilitation and
protecting the public.”118 While the courts take a somewhat broad ap-
proach in determining the appropriate conditions related to these
goals, the supreme court in J.W. stated that the “court’s discretion is
limited by constitutional safeguards and must be exercised in a rea-
111. In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d 747 (Ill. 2003), reh’g denied, 540 U.S. 873 (2003).
112. Id. at 750–51.
113. Id. at 750.
114. Id. at 750–51.
115. Id. at 762; 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-715(2)(r) (West 2000) (The geographical restric-
tion section of the statute remains good law today.).
116. In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d 747, 750–51, 761–62 (Ill. 2003), reh’g denied, 540 U.S. 873 (2003)
(The court also imposed a condition on J.W. that he need to register as a sex offender, J.W.
appealed the condition as well. The supreme court noted that this was not an erroneous
condition.).
117. Id. at 763.
118. Id. (emphasis added).
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sonable manner.”119 The courts are limited by the rights enumerated
and implied from the U.S. Constitution, and by a reasonable standard
set forth by the court itself. The court further stated that in order to be
reasonable, the probation condition may not be overly broad: “a con-
dition of probation must not be overly broad when viewed in the light
of the desired goal or the means to that end.”120 The court narrowed
its definition of reasonable:
Where a condition of probation requires a waiver of precious consti-
tutional rights, the condition must be narrowly drawn; to the extent
it is overbroad it is not reasonably related to the compelling state
interest in reformation and rehabilitation and is an unconstitutional
restriction on the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights.121
The supreme court further elaborated on the reasonableness re-
quirement of probation conditions in the context of J.W.— a context
which the courts have extrapolated to other conditions enumerated
and derived from the probation section of the JCA.122 The relation-
ship requirement of the condition, the crime, and the rehabilitative or
public safety purpose ensures that such purpose outweighs any impair-
ment of the individual’s constitutional rights of “freedom of travel,
speech, association, assembly and to the possession and enjoyment of
her property.”123 The court set forth a two-part analysis for determin-
ing the reasonableness of the condition: (1) relationship to the offense
and (2) the practical implications and wording of the condition in re-
gard to the breadth of the restriction.124 The court found the condition
was reasonably related to the offenses due to its nature and the public
attitude toward J.W.125 The children who were victims of J.W.’s sexual
crimes resided in the same neighborhood as J.W.126
After determining that the condition was adequately related to the
offense, the court stated that the condition that J.W. not be allowed to
119. Id.
120. Id. at 764.
121. Id. at 763–64 (quoting In re White, 158 Cal. Rptr. 562, 565 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)) In
considering the reasonableness of the condition, the court should also consider:
(1) whether the condition of probation reasonably relates to the rehabilitative purpose
of the legislation, (2) whether the value to the public in imposing this condition of
probation manifestly outweighs the impairment to the probationer’s constitutional
rights, and (3) whether there are any alternative means that are less subversive to the
probationer’s constitutional rights, but still comport with the purposes of conferring the
benefit of probation.
In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d 747, 764 (Ill. 2003), reh’g denied, 540 U.S. 873 (2003).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 764 (quoting People v. Beach, 195 Cal. Rptr. 381, 387 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)).
124. Id. at 764–65.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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enter the area “for any purpose is a condition of probation which is
not narrowly drawn and, thus, an unconstitutionally overbroad restric-
tion on J.W.’s exercise of his fundamental rights.”127 A total restric-
tion on an adjudicated individual’s ability to travel to a given location
in all conceivable situations was ruled by the court to be impermissibly
broad. The reasonableness standard applies to this prong of the analy-
sis as well.128 The court stated, in regard to a travel restriction, that the
condition is reasonable and not overly broad “only if (1) there is a
valid purpose for the restriction, and (2) there is a means by which the
probationer may obtain exemption from the restriction for legitimate
purposes.”129 The showing of a legitimate purpose for breaking the
condition—and the court’s allowance of such exceptions—“removes
the taint” of the restriction and allows for a supervised permissive ac-
tion that would otherwise be restricted by the probation order.130 The
Illinois Supreme Court noted that in order for the probation condition
to survive judicial scrutiny, the condition must be “narrowly
drawn.”131 The reasonable standard and legitimate purpose exception
detailed in J.W. calls for a narrow probation order which allows for
exceptions to a restriction when the defendant can put forth evidence
of a legitimate purpose.
2. Illinois First Appellate District
The Illinois First Appellate District has looked to apply the J.W.
reasonableness standard in cases that contain probation orders limit-
ing the associational rights of juveniles with gang members. The Illi-
nois First District appellate courts have also moved away from the
J.W. standard in instances where the probation orders contain restric-
tions on the type of content that can be posted on social media.
a. In re Omar F.
Omar F. relies heavily on the reasonable relationship and legitimate
purpose standard set forth in J.W.132 Omar F. robbed his victim at
127. In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 765 (emphasis in original).
128. Id.
129. Id. (The court noted: “[a] court may, as a condition of probation or other sentence short
of incarceration, bar a defendant from certain areas if the penalty is reasonably related to the
offense, provided that, if the defendant has a legitimate and compelling reason to go to that area
or place, he may apply to a specified authority for specific permission, as here to the probation
officer.” (emphasis in original) (quoting People v. Pickens, 542 N.E.2d 1253, 1256–57 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1989)).
130. Id. at 765.
131. Id.
132. In re Omar F., 89 N.E.3d 1023, 1023 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).
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gunpoint while using a shirt to cover his face.133 He was convicted of
armed robbery with a firearm and was sentenced to thirty-six months
of probation with various conditions.134 During the dispositional hear-
ing, the social investigation report concluded that Omar F. relied
heavily on his father and his older brother.135 Furthermore, the report
found that while Omar F. denied gang involvement himself, he ac-
knowledged that his friends were involved in the Black Peace Stones
gang.136 The court imposed a probation order under its authority in
the JCA and ordered Omar F. not to associate with any gang mem-
bers on social media and remove all drug- and gang-related content
from his social media pages.137 The written dispositional order con-
tained a checkmark next to “no gang contact or activity” and con-
tained the handwritten note: “no gangs, guns or drugs,” and “clear all
social media of gangs, drugs.”138 Omar F. appealed the probation or-
der by arguing that (1) the no gang-related conditions were not rea-
sonably related to the crimes, and (2) the conditions were
unconstitutional as applied to him since they were “overbroad and
unreasonable.”139
The court took the language directly from J.W. and stated that when
determining whether a probation condition is valid, the “overriding
concern is reasonableness.”140 Again, the court applied the test in J.W.
and announced that in order for a condition to be determined reason-
able the court must consider:
(1) whether the condition of probation reasonably relates to the re-
habilitative purpose of the legislation, (2) whether the value to the
public in imposing this condition of probation manifestly outweighs
the impairment to the probationer’s constitutional rights, and (3)
whether there are any alternative means that are less subversive to
the probationer’s constitutional rights, but still comport with the
purposes of conferring the benefit of probation.141
Turning specifically to the matter at hand, the court noted that the
JCA allows circuit courts to limit juvenile gang contact.142 The court
cited § 5-715(2)(s) of the JCA and concluded that the court does in
133. Id. at 1027.
134. Id. at 1026.
135. Id. at 1030–31.
136. Id. at 1031.
137. Id. at 1031–32.
138. In re Omar F., 89 N.E.3d at 1032.
139. Id. at 1035.
140. Id. at 1037.
141. Id.; Sweeney & Frye, supra note 1.
142. In re Omar F., 89 N.E.3d 1023, 1038 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).
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fact have the power to prohibit gang member contact.143 The court
noted the purpose of the juvenile court is to act as parens patriae144 to
the minor to ensure that the minor follows through with her rehabili-
tation.145 Noting that Omar F. had friends who were gang members,
the court concluded “attempting to limit the minor respondent’s con-
tact (real or virtual) with gang members was a valid condition of pro-
bation because it was related to his rehabilitation.”146 Just as the
geographical provision in J.W. was reasonably related to the public
safety of the victims of the defendant’s crimes, the no gang contact
order in Omar F. was reasonably related to preventing a minor from
becoming a gang member himself— thus it was related to the crime in
a rehabilitative nature.147
However, the court stated that the no contact provision, while rea-
sonably related to the probationary goal of rehabilitation, was over-
broad and not narrowly tailored.148 The trial court’s blanket order did
not allow any exceptions.149 Noting again the language from J.W., the
court objected to the order’s lack of an exception for “legitimate pur-
poses” in which the defendant might have been able to communicate
with known gang members on social media.150 The main qualm that
the court seemed to have with the order is that in the social investiga-
tion report, Omar F. stated he looked up to his brother the most, since
his brother “has been in the system but has turned his life around.”151
Without any guidance or opportunity for a legitimate purpose excep-
tion to the no-contact order, Omar F. would not be able to have com-
munications with, or content posted with, his older brother.152 The
court ruled that this inability to have legitimate contacts on social me-
dia was fatal to the probation order.153
143. Id. (“(2) The court may as a condition of probation require that the minor(s) refrain from
having any contact, directly or indirectly, with certain specified persons or particular types of
persons, including but not limited to members of street gangs.” (quoting 705 ILL. COMP. STAT.
405/5-715(2)(s) (2018)).
144. Parens patriae, supra note 2.





150. Id. at 1038.
151. In re Omar F., 89 N.E.3d at 1039.
152. Id.
153. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-4\DPL401.txt unknown Seq: 21 24-JUN-20 9:23
2020] UNFRIENDING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 997
b. In re R.H.
R.H. was decided immediately following the Omar F. decision and
reached the outcome that the defendant’s probation order was consti-
tutionally valid, while using an analysis that diverged from the J.W.
reasonableness analysis.154 The court stated that its reason for not fol-
lowing the J.W. precedent was that the restrictions in the juvenile’s
probation order were content-based restrictions on speech.155 R.H.
was an admitted gang member and had social media accounts that
were full of gang content, which included photographs of him and
other gang members flashing gang signs, as well as other images of
guns and drugs.156 After a guilty verdict for unlawful use of a weapon
and possession of cannabis with intent to deliver, the juvenile court
imposed a content-based restriction on R.H.’s social media sites.157
The term of probation contained several conditions:
Among the conditions of probation, the trial court ordered R.H.
have no contact with “any gangs, guns, or drugs which means it
looks to [the court that] you need to get some new friends.” The
trial court also ordered R.H. to delete from his social media ac-
counts “all references to gangs, guns, or drugs.”158
R.H. argued that the condition that restricted his posting on social
media was an unconstitutional “content-based restriction that fails for
lack of sufficiently narrow tailoring.”159 The court decided that the
probation orders were content-based restrictions since “it restricts
[R.H’s] social media postings on three express topics (gangs, guns, and
drugs), even without specifying whether the content is pro- or anti-
gangs, guns, or drugs.”160 After determining that this probation order
was a content-based restriction, the court proceeded under a strict
scrutiny standard, and stated “the regulation must be ‘narrowly tai-
lored to serve compelling state interests.’”161 The asserted interest of
the juvenile court is to act in the place of the parent in making a pro-
bationary decision to rehabilitate and protect the minor.162 The court
also noted that minors are afforded lesser rights than adults in the
probationary setting, based on their vulnerability and susceptibility to
154. In re R.H., 99 N.E.3d 29, 32 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017), reh’g denied, 99 N.E.3d 29 (Ill. App. Ct.
2018).
155. Id. at 32–33.
156. Id. at 33.
157. Id. at 32–33.
158. Id. at 32.
159. Id.
160. In re R.H., 99 N.E.3d at 32–33.
161. Id. at 33.
162. Id.
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influence.163 The court stated the importance of a parental figure in its
decision-making process, stating:
A probation condition that implicates fundamental constitutional
rights has to reasonably relate to the “compelling state interest in
reformation and rehabilitation.” . . . . To be reasonable, a probation
condition must narrowly focus on its rehabilitative goal. In assessing
a probation condition’s reasonableness, courts also consider if (i)
the probation condition reasonably relates to rehabilitation, (ii) the
value of the probation condition to society plainly outweighs the
loss of the probationer’s constitutional rights, and (iii) less restric-
tive means are available. Courts also may look to the individual
characteristics of the defendant.164
The court ultimately held that, in light of the defendant’s extensive
gang involvement and past postings, and unlike in Omar F., the state
had a compelling interest in rehabilitating R.H. and protecting him
from influential gang members and the harms associated with gangs in
his neighborhood.165
The condition must also be narrowly tailored as a means to achieve
the valid purpose of rehabilitation and safety.166 The court noted that
juvenile delinquency proceedings are not the same as criminal pro-
ceedings, again noting that minors are not afforded the same amount
of rights as adults, especially in a probationary setting.167 The court
“[found] the restriction sufficiently narrow. The condition focuses on
the goal of reforming R.H.’s behavior and steering him away from
involvement with gangs, guns, and drugs. The order limits its reach to
the matters specifically related to the exact behavior for which R.H.
was an adjudicated delinquent.”168 Although the order did not iden-
tify what is gang content specifically, it had a narrow nexus to the
crime since it was directly related to the valid purpose of rehabilita-
tion and protection. Furthermore, the minor’s social media activity
was directly related to his rehabilitation.169 The court noted that mi-
nors are using social media at a quickly growing rate and it is becom-
ing part of everyday use and life.170 The court went in depth on the
practical issues surrounding the writing and implementation of such
163. Id. at 34.
164. Id. (internal citations omitted).
165. Id. at 35.
166. In re R.H., 99 N.E.3d at 34–35.
167. Id. at 35.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. (“If the juvenile court has any hope of steering R.H. toward a new direction and
productive life, it would be absurd to target only real-world behavior and ignore online activity.
And if the trial court tried to restrict only postings that glorified guns, gangs, or drugs, R.H.’s
probation officer would be in the impossible position of parsing each of his social media posts to
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valid orders, which primarily center on sufficiently narrowing the or-
ders and descriptions of the barred activities so that they will not im-
properly impinge on other constitutional rights not related to the
rehabilitation of the minor.171 Specifically the court noted:
If the trial court aims for specificity, it runs the risk of making the
order too narrow to cover the behavior that should be prohibited
for the juvenile to rehabilitate him- or herself, and invites an unco-
operative and resistant juvenile to find ways to maneuver around
the prohibitions. . . . There is no positive benefit to either R.H. or
society for allowing R.H. to post about gangs in any context—there
is no benefit to muddling the order with specifics.172
The court dismissed the notion that a call for specificity in the order
would alleviate any perceived issues with the narrow tailoring prong
of the content-based speech test.173
II. ANALYSIS
First, this Part will show that the court in Omar F. failed to properly
appreciate and apply the constitutional test for a regulation that in-
fringes on the right of association, despite arriving at the “right” out-
come due to the state’s compelling governmental interest. The court
did not apply the correct test, but in a sense, it can be viewed as harm-
less error—had it applied the right test, it would have reasoned that
the state had a compelling interest and passed strict scrutiny. Second,
this Part will show that the state does have a compelling interest—the
government is acting under the doctrine of parens patriae in relation
to the adjudicated delinquents in an effort to provide rehabilitation.
However, this Part will go on to argue that, under both the right of
association framework and the regulation of content-based speech
framework, the probation orders are not narrowly tailored to the in-
terest of rehabilitation and protecting the juveniles.
determine a violation. For the restriction to be effective, it must be practical, it must be feasible,
and it must be enforceable.”).
171. Id. at 36–37. (“We recognize the difficulty of drafting an effective order consistent with
constitutional demands and sensitive to the characteristics of young people engaged in delin-
quency. The dissent contends that the trial court should have named which gangs and which
visual symbols, colors, or words associated with those gangs R.H. was prohibited from posting.
But this is impractical and counterproductive . . . . The same impracticality extends to the dis-
sent’s suggestion that the trial court must define the word ‘gang.’ The trial judge, the probation
officer, and, surely, R.H. know what “gangs” mean, and to suggest otherwise, as do the articles
cited by the dissent, is sophistry.” (internal citations omitted)).
172. In re R.H., 99 N.E.3d at 37.
173. Id.
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A. Right of Association in In re Omar F.’s Reasonableness Analysis
The court in Omar F. adopted the reasonableness standard that the
Illinois Supreme Court established for geographical restrictions de-
rived from the JCA.174 However, this test fails to fully appreciate the
test the United States Supreme Court laid out for the right of associa-
tion in Jaycees and Dale.175 It is not illegal to be a member of a gang.
Therefore, the first step should be to turn to Dale and determine
whether or not a gang, or individual connected to a gang, is entitled to
the protections of the right of association.176 In order to be awarded
right of association protection, the group must engage in “expressive
association.”177 Gangs clearly engage in expression, both public and
private.178 Gangs are federally defined as “[a]n association of three or
more individuals . . . [w]hose members” adopt a collective identity.179
Gangs use “a common name, slogan, identifying sign, symbol, tattoo
or other physical marking, style or color of clothing, hairstyle, hand
sign or graffiti . . .” to create their collective identity and persona.180
Gang members engage in criminal activity, and may adopt rules, meet
on a recurring basis, and provide physical protection of its mem-
bers.181 Gangs, by their federal definition, meet the requirement of a
group displaying expressive association, and their members are there-
fore entitled to the protection of the right of association. The court in
Omar F. should have then looked to determine if the governmental
restriction (in this case, the juvenile probation order) was supported
by a compelling governmental interest, unrelated to the suppression
of ideas, and that the interest could not be met through other less
restrictive means.182 Put more succinctly, if gangs are entitled to asso-
ciational rights, then the court in Omar F. should have applied the
Jaycees test to determine whether or not the probation orders infringe
on the juvenile’s ability to associate with other gang members.
Despite the appearance that gangs may be entitled to First Amend-
ment protection under the right of association, whether or not gangs
are involved in sufficient “expressive association” is far from set-
174. In re Omar F., 89 N.E.3d 1023, 1037 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).
175. See generally Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); Boy Scouts of Am. v.
Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
176. Dale, 530 U.S. at 648.
177. Id.
178. Id.




182. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
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tled.183 However, even if the gangs are not involved in activity pro-
tected under the right of association, the probation orders still must
pass the test for validity as regulations on conduct with incidental ef-
fects on speech.184 To pass this test, the regulations must further an
important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the sup-
pression of free expression and restrict no more speech than necessary
to further that interest.185 The test is actually quite similar to the test
of the right of association protection; however, due to the required
interest strength, the test under the incidental effects doctrine is more
deferential to the government.
The First District court instead chose to impose the reasonableness
test found in J.W., instead of either the Jaycees or O’Brien test.186 Es-
sentially, the court adopted the language of the Jaycees test, but in-
stilled a “reasonableness” term that entailed a different analysis from
the test as it was announced in Jaycees. The J.W. test, as used in Omar
F., asks whether there is a “valid” purpose for the restriction and if
there are any exceptions for “legitimate purposes.”187 This reasona-
bleness test is not the same as the constitutional right of association
test which calls for a compelling governmental interest. “Valid pur-
pose” and “compelling interest” are not synonymous.
Furthermore, the probation order in Omar F. also included content-
based speech restrictions: “You need to clear [gang, drug, and gun
related material] from your social media.”188 In order to survive a
challenge to a content-based speech restriction, the regulation must
have a compelling governmental interest and be narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest.189 The court orders at issue here are restrictions
that target a specific topic, and therefore require a restriction that is
narrowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest.190
183. Determining whether or not they truly are is outside the scope of this Comment and,
therefore, that threshold question will not be reached. Furthermore, an exploration of whether
the illegal activity gangs participate in disqualifies them from associational protection is also
beyond the scope of this Comment.
184. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–78 (1968).
185. Id. at 382.
186. In re Omar F., 89 N.E.3d 1023, 1037 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).
187. Id.; In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d 747, 765 (Ill. 2003), reh’g denied, 540 U.S. 873 (2003).
188. In re Omar F., 89 N.E.3d at 1031–32.
189. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231–32 (2015).
190. Id.
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B. Rehabilitation as a Compelling Governmental Interest
Both Omar F. and R.H. state that the government’s interest in these
regulations is the rehabilitation of the adjudicated delinquents.191
Both the United States Supreme Court and the Illinois Supreme
Court have recognized that the rehabilitation of youths is a compel-
ling governmental interest.192 In light of the courts’ view of street
gangs, it is clear that the government has a strong interest in rehabili-
tating juveniles by limiting their contact with gang members. The Illi-
nois Supreme Court has noted that “street gangs are regarded with
considerable disfavor by other segments of our society.”193 This inter-
est in protecting minors from street gangs is also motivated by the way
courts view their role in protecting the “innocent” nature of children.
The United States Supreme Court has also weighed in and stated that
“children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of
sentencing.”194 The Court has found that children differ from adults
because of their immaturity and lesser sense of responsibility.195 The
Court has further claimed that juveniles are more vulnerable to nega-
tive influences resulting from an inability to remove themselves from
settings that involve criminal activity.196
Lastly, the Court stated that juveniles lack fixed characters and per-
sonalities which allows them to further develop along with their poor
tendencies or judgments.197 For instance, studies have shown that
juveniles with Type-T personalities tend to be more drawn to gang
involvement.198 Adolescents who have a Type-T personality include
those “who seek thrills (T), stimulation, excitement, attention, and
arousal. They tend to be risk takers, have unruly behavior, and get
into more trouble.”199 Type-T juveniles are more susceptible to the
risky, violent, and fringe behavior involved in gang life.200 Courts, in
their goals of rehabilitation and ensuring the safety of juveniles, may
consider including personality type-centered treatment to achieve
such a goal. In light of the Supreme Court’s views on juveniles, proba-
191. In re R.H., 99 N.E.3d 29, 32 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017), reh’g denied, 99 N.E.3d 29 (Ill. App. Ct.
2018); In re Omar F., 89 N.E.3d at 1023.
192. See United States v. Albanese, 554 F.2d 543, 546 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The great desideratum
(is) the giving to young and new violators of the law a chance to reform and to escape the
contaminating influence of association with hardened or veteran criminals . . . .”).
193. People v. Strain, 742 N.E.2d 315, 320 (Ill. 2000).




198. Kim & Kipper, supra note 25, at 14.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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tion responsibilities, and gangs, it is clear that the government’s inter-
est in rehabilitation and guiding adjudicated delinquents away from
gang involvement is a compelling interest.
C. The Probation Orders are Fundamentally Overbroad as Applied
Although the state’s interest in rehabilitating juveniles and keeping
them away from gang members is a compelling interest, once the or-
ders are applied to the individual minors, they will prove to be over-
broad and thus not narrowly tailored to the government’s interest.
The Omar F. court acknowledged that the reason for overturning the
probation order was that it did not allow for the juvenile to have con-
tacts with his brother.201 The probation order did not allow for excep-
tions that would permit the juvenile to talk to a close family member.
Especially considering that a poor home environment is a leading
cause of gang involvement, the inability to communicate with a sibling
could prove to have negative effects on the juvenile’s rehabilitation.202
The content-based restriction seen in R.H. also proves to be uncon-
stitutionally vague and overbroad in practice. Taking for granted that
the average person understands what is meant by the term “gangs,”
the court does not describe with specificity what amounts to gang con-
tent. Gang symbols cover a diverse spectrum of the symbolic world—
from religious symbols to anything the gang dreams up that is used to
identify with and create a collective identity behind.203 The probation
orders, even if drawn to limit only the posting of “gang-related” con-
tent, will not catch everything—the probation officer may not fully
know what the total collection of the gang’s symbols are.204
Alternatively, the content order may be overinclusive if the proba-
tion order forbids including a color or a common symbol by labeling it
as gang insignia. For example, the dissent in R.H. noted that “[e]ven a
picture of R.H. standing in an open field may violate the court’s or-
der—if a court decides that the depiction of the blue sky refers to a
gang that uses blue as its gang color.”205 Similarly, if a gang adopts the
Chicago Cubs hat as a gang symbol, will a court bar the juvenile from
publicly supporting the baseball club? The probation orders in prac-
tice, as they are currently being written, include activities and commu-
201. In re Omar F., 89 N.E.3d 1023, 1039 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).
202. Kim & Kipper, supra note 25, at 13.
203. In re R.H., 99 N.E.3d 29, 39–41 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017), reh’g denied, 99 N.E.3d 29 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2018) (Neville, J., dissenting).
204. Gangs also use social media to throw verbal jabs at rival gangs, conceal drug dealing with
emoji-text in an effort to throw law enforcement of their trail, and even in some situations bro-
ker peace deals with rival gangs. Kordas, supra note 44.
205. In re R.H., 99 N.E.3d at 39–41 (Neville, J., dissenting).
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nications that are not aligned with the rehabilitative goals of the court.
It is not an impossible stretch of the imagination to see how the proba-
tion orders are overinclusive: A probation order that directs the juve-
nile not to post “gang content” or talk with “gang members” on social
media will sweep up with its content and conduct that may be non-
gang related unbeknownst to the court. This is a clear case of an over-
inclusive application of this type of court order.
The factors which lead to youth gang involvement are also instruc-
tive in this regard.206 It is not difficult to see how a juvenile who is
drawn into a gang and surrounded by narcotics and alcohol is more
likely to be involved in criminal activity. This also adds to the problem
of a small number of role models that juveniles can turn to. Further-
more, an awareness that children are subjected to pressures of narcot-
ics and alcohol can also lend insight into how to best treat and
rehabilitate adjudicated delinquents who are in threat of gang involve-
ment. By allowing them to have contacts with reformed gang mem-
bers, the children would have the opportunity to have a role model in
their lives who could help them move away from illicit activities, and
thus away from the pull of gangs. A successful parallel is the example
of Alcoholics Anonymous. Alcoholics have the opportunity to lean on
reformed alcoholics for support from someone in a unique position to
understand their struggle. The way the court orders are currently writ-
ten forecloses this possibility. The way in which the current court or-
ders are being written prevents this possibility.
No matter how the court determines to specify the content or limit
the ways in which a juvenile can communicate with gang members, the
practical impossibility of preventing the order from overreaching and
the resulting ineffectiveness will not allow the orders to be considered
narrowly tailored. Both aspects of the orders, the content-based
speech regulations and the conduct (contacts) restrictions, cannot sur-
vive their respective doctrinal tests if there are less prohibitive alter-
native means of achieving the compelling or sufficient governmental
interest.207 The courts can avoid the need to adhere to First Amend-
ment scrutiny by crafting the court orders to prohibit conduct or
speech that is not protected by the First Amendment. For example,
the order could prevent the child from eliciting or conspiring with
others to commit an illegal act.208 Conspiring to commit an illegal act
206. See infra Part I.A.3.
207. See In re Omar F., 89 N.E.3d 1023, 1038 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017) (citing 705 ILL. COMP. STAT.
405/5-715(2)(s) (West 2016)); Sweeney & Frye, supra note 1; Parens patriae, supra note 2.
208. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
771–72 (1976).
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is a crime and therefore unprotected speech. The order could also pre-
vent the juvenile from posting words that would “incite an imminent
breach of the peace.”209 These postings would be “fighting words,”
and thus the court would be able to regulate the speech unabated by
the First Amendment. These examples demonstrate that there are less
prohibitive alternative means to achieving the state’s interests. But
even in the valid examples above, the regulation would only prohibit
actions on social media. This would again call into question the close-
ness of the fit to the governmental interest of rehabilitation and juve-
nile safety.
Ultimately, it becomes a question of levels of rights: how much are
a juvenile’s rights dismissed when they have been found guilty of a
crime and are sentenced to a term of probation, conditional discharge,
or supervision? Their rights should not be dismissed at a level that
deprives them of their rights of association and free speech under the
First Amendment. The courts impose these conditions under the no-
tion of parens patriae. However, even under this doctrine, children
should not be afforded less rights under the First Amendment simply
due to their age.
III. IMPACT
Although it seems that the no-contact and no-gang-content proba-
tion orders will not be able to meet the constitutional tests for regula-
tion, it is unlikely that their source, the JCA, will be overturned.210
Assuming the probation orders will continue to be handed down in
line with the rules identified in Omar F. and R.H., it is important to
understand the practical implications. First, the already overworked
probation officers in charge of the supervision and enforcement of the
adjudicated delinquents will be given the nearly impossible task of
surveying ever-evolving social media platforms. Secondly, the proba-
209. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
210. The Supreme Court has stated that invalidation of a statue as overbroad is unacceptable
if the “‘remainder of the statute . . . covers a whole range of easily identifiable and constitution-
ally proscribable . . . conduct . . . .’”  Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 760 (1974) (quoting United
States Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 580–81 (1973)). Fur-
thermore, when the benefit of the statue substantially outweighs the harm caused by the over-
breadth of the regulation, the overbreadth is to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. New York
v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773–74 (1982). When constitutional objection is raised to a statute as-
applied, “a court will typically apply a general norm or test and, in doing so, may engage in
reasoning that marks the statute as unenforceable in its totality.” Richard H. Fallon, As-Applied
and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1328 (2000). It is
unlikely that a court will invalidate all of the provisions of the JCA, specifically the probation
section, because of the improper application of one of its provisions which attempts to limit
juveniles’ gang-involvement.
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tion orders will unfortunately maintain what the courts and govern-
ments are not fully addressing, and perhaps even indirectly aiding—
the true socio-economic causes of juvenile gang involvement.
A. Probation Services
The officers of the Illinois Juvenile Probation and Court Services
Department of Cook County (JPCSD) are in charge of overseeing the
probation of adjudicated delinquents and ensuring they comply with
their probation conditions.211 The objectives of the JPCSD include a
thorough investigation and reporting of the circumstances that shape
the juvenile’s behavior, which the probation officers use to create indi-
vidual plans to aid the juvenile.212 In addition to supervising the pro-
bation conditions imposed by the court, the probation officers work
individually with each of their assigned juveniles to determine a plan
that will allow the minors to become better members of their commu-
nity and mature away from criminal and destructive behaviors.213 The
number of juveniles on probation compared to the number of proba-
tion officers, especially in Cook County, illustrates the magnitude of
the job that faces the officers. The Cook County Juvenile Probation
and Court Services Administration (JPCSA) employs approximately
51 support staff and 322 sworn personnel, with a budget of nearly $46
million in 2020.214 On the other hand, as of December 31, 2017, there
were 5,282 juveniles with open probation cases in the state of
Illinois.215
Not only do the probation officers have to deal with “ordinary” pro-
bation conditions such as geographical location and home confine-
ment, they also must deal with monitoring the social media activity of
certain cases in light of the Omar F. and R.H. decisions. This difficulty
is exacerbated by the ever-evolving technologically-driven culture sur-
rounding social media. It should be noted that these probation orders,
on their face, may appear to bring up Fourth Amendment concerns in
their application due to the government monitoring. However, the
Fourth Amendment’s third-party doctrine allows for the disclosure of
information stored by a third-party custodian without the showing
211. JUVENILE PROBATION & COURT SERVS DEP’T, Juvenile Probation & Court Services, State
of Illinois Circuit Court of Cook County (2018), http://www.cookcountycourt.org/ABOUT-
THECOURT/OfficeoftheChiefJudge/ProbationDepartments/ProbationForJuveniles/Adminis-




215. ILL. COURTS, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT: SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS, http://www.illinois
courts.gov/SupremeCourt/AnnualReport/2018/SOI_Annual_Report_2017_Bookmarks.pdf.
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necessary to obtain a warrant.216 The Supreme Court in Carpenter v.
United States turned the third-party doctrine on its head by stating
that cell-site location information requires a warrant for its re-
trieval.217 However, the Court made clear that its narrow holding did
not “address other business records that might incidentally reveal lo-
cation information[,]” including Facebook.218
The probation officer’s task is made even more difficult by the ever-
evolving technology and culture surrounding social media. First, the
gang list maintained by CPD is criticized for being inaccurate and un-
derinclusive.219 A probation officer, assigned to a juvenile with a no-
contact probation order, may check the Facebook interactions of his
assigned juvenile while cross-referencing the names with the CPD
gang list. However, the under-inclusiveness of the gang list leads to a
significant possibility that the probation officer will not catch gang
communications. Secondly, the way social media is designed and used
may also lead to slips in the system. A juvenile may post a picture or
communicate with a known gang member, and the post may be de-
leted, altered, or expire by the time the probation officer gets around
to checking the account. There is also the growing use of “burner”
accounts, in which an individual will create an account under a pseu-
donym.220 The juvenile may be communicating with a gang member
and the probation officer would have no way of knowing. The juvenile
may even create a burner account of their own and avoid detection.
B. Avoiding the Problem
The use of the probation orders in Omar F. and R.H. avoids con-
fronting the socio-economic causes of youth gang involvement head
on. As discussed in Part I.A.3 juveniles are drawn to gangs due to the
allure of potential illicit income and protection provided by the other
members.221 Additionally, youth are pushed to gangs due to poor
home life and a cycle of poverty and violence in some neighborhoods
around Chicago.222 A poor home life is a leading cause of youth gang-
216. Linda Greene, Mining Metadata: The Gold Standard for Authenticating Social Media Evi-
dence in Illinois, 68 DEPAUL L. REV. 103, 135 (2018).
217. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018); Greene, supra note 216, at
135–36.
218. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220; Greene, supra note 216, at 136.
219. Sweeney & Frye, supra note 1.
220. See, e.g., Nick Schwartz, Kevin Durant explains why he created burner accounts on social
media, FORTHEWIN (Mar. 15, 2019), https://ftw.usatoday.com/2019/03/kevin-durant-burner-ac-
count (explaining that the anonymity of the burner accounts allow him to freely communicate
with his family and friends).
221. Kim & Kipper, supra note 25.
222. Id.
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involvement.223 The probation condition in Omar F. limited the con-
tact that Omar F. could have with his older brother.224 Older siblings
are often viewed by their younger counterparts as role models. It
seems counterintuitive to limit contact with a role model figure, even
if just on social media, if it is your goal to rehabilitate the juvenile and
his attitude toward home life and his community. The court should
have used the provisions of the JCA it had at its disposal to create real
change in the juvenile’s life.225 Perhaps the court could have instituted
an order that called for vocational training or community involve-
ment, which would not only have gotten the kid off the streets and
away from the gang members’ direct influence, but also given him
skills and tools to work his way out of the cycle of poverty that engulfs
many of the neighborhoods with high gang involvement and crime.
Similarly, the court order in R.H. ultimately focused on what the juve-
nile was posting on social media, and not on what perhaps caused him
to be in the situation he was when he committed his crime. Courts
should turn their focus to imposing conditions that give youth the
tools to create a better life for themselves, rather than just telling
them what they can and cannot do on Facebook and Twitter.
CONCLUSION
The neighborhoods most affected by gang violence in Chicago have
been witnesses to cycles of poverty, violence, and court interventions.
Circuit courts in Cook County have responded to the growing use of
social media by gangs with probation orders limiting juveniles’ inter-
action with gang members on social media and gang-related content
on their profiles. The hope is that these social media restrictions will
steer the kids away from gangs and somehow lower their willingness
to join them. While the JCA provides a legal footing for such restric-
tions that can pass First Amendment scrutiny, the practical application
of the orders proves to be missing the mark. It goes without saying
that it is beyond the scope and powers of the courts to create social,
political, and state policies to try and fix the unfortunate problems of
gangs and the socio-economic deficiencies that cause them. However,
the courts can use the tools at their disposal to do their part. Inciden-
tally preventing juveniles from socializing on social media with legiti-
mate associates and preventing how they express themselves will
prove to be an ineffective path for the court to take, and even add to
223. Id.
224. In re Omar F., 89 N.E.3d 1023, 1039 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).
225. In re R.H, 99 N.E.3d 29, 33 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017); People v. Hugo G., 750 N.E.2d 247, 256
(Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (quoting In re M.P., 697 N.E.2d 1153, 1156 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)).
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the problems. The Illinois juvenile courts should be more concerned
with providing juveniles the resources they need to better themselves
and others than with what posts they give a thumbs-up to.
Nicholas F. Curta
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